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Abstract: 
We explore how limits to our insight about the underlying decision-making structure of 
firms may affect the conclusions we draw about the likely impacts of participation in 
voluntary environmental programs. We develop a theoretical model to examine the 
conditions under which a multi-facility firm chooses to employ a standardized adoption 
policy for a voluntary program. We test this model empirically using a firm-level dataset 
on the adoption of a voluntary environmental auditing program and find that, consistent 
with the theoretical model, a standardized auditing outcome is less likely among firms 
with more heterogeneous portfolios of facilities. We also examine the effect of 
environmental auditing on facility compliance using both firm-level and facility-level 
controls. We find that the estimated effect depends on whether or not measures that proxy 
for firm incentives for standardization are included in the analysis. These findings 
suggest caution in drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of voluntary programs in 
improving compliance based on analyses that assume standardization on the part of the 
firm. 
 
Keywords: voluntary programs, environmental auditing, compliance, standardization, 
multi-facility firm 
JEL codes: Q53, Q58, L29 
                                                        
a Corresponding author, The Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont McKenna College, 
500 E. Ninth Street, Claremont, CA 91711, mevans@cmc.edu, tel. 909.607.3423, fax 909.621.8249 
b Department of Economics and International Business, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 
77341, lxl004@shsu.edu  
c Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187 
slstaf@wm.edu  
 2 
Standardization and the Impacts of Voluntary Program Participation: Evidence from 
Environmental Auditing 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, participation in voluntary environmental programs and other 
forms of industry self-regulation has received increased emphasis from both regulators 
and scholars as a potential means of improving compliance with environmental 
regulations.1 As noted by Khanna and Broule [3], the number voluntary programs 
sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grew dramatically from 
28 programs in 1996 to 54 in 1999 and to 87 in 2005. Although the growth of these 
programs has slowed in the Obama administration, EPA continues to support a large 
number of voluntary initiatives, with more recent programs focused on energy and 
climate change.2 A number of studies have examined the incentives for participation in 
voluntary programs and/or the effectiveness of participation on environmental 
performance.3 The empirical evidence on program effectiveness is mixed with some 
studies showing modest success and others showing no discernable impacts, even among 
analyses that focus on the same program. One possible explanation for these mixed 
results is that many voluntary programs focus on encouraging firms to participate 
whereas compliance with formal environmental regulations is usually assessed at 
the facility level. 
                                                        
1 This appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by significant reductions in enforcement resources at 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which decreased by 5 percent in real terms between 1997 and 
2006 [1]. Kotchen [2] cites the political feasibility of agency-sponsored voluntary programs as one factor 
explaining their proliferation. 
2 See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/voluntaryprograms.html for information on these 
programs. 
3 See Khanna and Brouhle [3] and Prakash and Potoski [4] for reviews. 
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Non-mandatory approaches to environmental protection encompass a diverse set 
of programs but, relative to formal regulation, most voluntary programs allow 
participating entities a greater degree of flexibility in implementation. For many 
voluntary programs, a participating firm can implement the program at some of its 
facilities but not at others or can implement a different set of program-related actions at 
each of its facilities. However, this decision making process is generally unobserved. In 
most instances, only the firm-level decision about whether or not to participate is known. 
Thus empirical efforts to examine the effects of voluntary program participation on 
environmental performance often require the researcher to make an assumption about the 
nature of program participation and, ultimately, the process of decision-making within 
multi-facility firms. Constraints imposed by available data usually drive this assumption 
as many empirical studies only have data on participation at the firm level and assume, 
explicitly or implicitly, a standardized application of the voluntary program across all 
facilities owned by a firm. For the most part these empirical analyses have not accounted 
for the possibility of heterogeneous application of the voluntary program across the 
firm’s various facilities.  
The goal of this paper is to better understand how firms make decisions about 
facility-level participation in voluntary programs and how this process impacts our ability 
to make valid inferences about the effects of participation on environmental performance. 
We develop a theoretical model that identifies the conditions under which a multi-facility 
firm chooses to employ a standardized adoption policy for a voluntary program rather 
than a heterogeneous policy in which some of the firm’s facilities adopt the program 
while others do not. The model suggests that the incentives for a firm to employ a 
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standardized adoption policy weaken as the degree of heterogeneity among facilities 
owned by a firm increases. This intuitive result holds whether the firm uses a centralized 
or decentralized decision-making structure and calls into question the frequently invoked 
assumption that the decision to adopt a voluntary program is uniformly applied to all of a 
firm’s facilities. We then test this model empirically to see whether our theoretical 
predictions of the factors that encourage firms to standardize adoption decisions hold. In 
particular, we use a firm-level dataset on the adoption of a voluntary environmental 
program, an environmental audit, across a firm’s facilities. We also examine the effect of 
adoption on facility compliance using both firm-level and facility-level controls. Since 
the incentives for adoption of an environmental auditing program are similar to those for 
adoption of other voluntary environmental programs, we believe that the results of our 
study can provide insight for evaluating a wide range of voluntary environmental 
programs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss 
previous empirical studies that analyze the impacts of voluntary program participation 
with a focus on environmental auditing as well as another well-known voluntary 
program, the EPA’s 33/50 program. Section 3 develops a model of program adoption 
within a multi-facility firm to explore the incentives for employing a standardized versus 
a heterogeneous adoption policy. In Section 4, we test the model’s implications in a firm-
level analysis of the decision to adopt a standardized auditing policy and find results 
broadly consistent with our theoretical predictions. In section 5, we further explore the 
implications of our model using a facility-level empirical analysis of the effect of audit 
adoption on compliance. We find that when we include both a facility-level adoption 
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measure and firm-level controls in our empirical analysis, auditing does not have a 
significant effect on compliance. However, when the firm-level controls are excluded, we 
find a positive and significant effect of environmental auditing on facility compliance. 
Section 6 discusses the implications of our results. In particular, we suggest that 
researchers use caution in assuming that firm-level participation in a program applies 
equally to all facilities owned by that firm, as such an assumption may induce systematic 
measurement error that could affect the results of their analyses and alter policy-relevant 
conclusions.  
 
2. The environmental performance effects of voluntary program participation:
 evidence from environmental auditing and the 33/50 program  
Voluntary environmental initiatives can range from a government-sponsored 
voluntary program (e.g., Energy Star) to programs sponsored by trade associations (e.g., 
the American Chemistry Council’s Responsible Care Program) to unilateral initiatives 
undertaken by the regulated entity without direct government involvement. Regardless of 
type, most voluntary programs provide explicit or implicit incentives for participation and 
involve actions that go beyond what is required by various environmental statutes. As 
discussed in Lyon and Maxwell [5], incentives for participation mainly fall into three 
categories: participation may make the regulated entity more attractive to consumers and 
investors, participation may shape current and future regulatory decisions by reducing 
enforcement effort or preempting future regulations, and participation may result in 
increased productivity or efficiency at the regulated entity.  
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Environmental auditing is one example of a voluntary environmental program.  
An environmental audit is “...a systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by 
regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental 
requirements” and EPA has long suggested environmental auditing programs as a way for 
regulated firms to improve their environmental compliance as well as environmental 
performance more generally [6].4  EPA’s Audit Policy also provides explicit incentives 
for firms to voluntarily adopt environmental auditing, as firms that choose to report and 
correct violations discovered during the course of a voluntary environmental audit are 
eligible for significant penalty reductions.5 Many states also have their own audit policies 
that actively encourage environmental auditing by granting statutory privilege for 
environmental audit reports and/or immunity from penalties for violations discovered 
(and corrected and disclosed) during the course of an audit.6  
EPA has embraced environmental auditing because, at least in theory, such audits 
provide a mechanism to improve a regulated entity’s compliance with environmental 
regulations.7 Survey and anecdotal evidence suggests positive impacts of auditing on 
environmental performance [16, 17]. Additionally, three previous empirical studies                                                         
4 50 FR 46504, Section II.A. The academic literature on environmental regulation and compliance (as well 
as that on compliance more generally) sometimes uses the term audit more generally to mean any periodic 
inspection or review of an entity’s compliance status. To distinguish reviews initiated by regulators from 
those initiated by regulated entities and to be consistent with EPA’s terminology, we use the term “audit” to 
refer to reviews voluntarily undertaken by the regulated entity and “inspection” to refer to reviews initiated 
by regulators (and thus involuntary from the perspective of the regulated party).  
5 Pfaff and Sanchirico [7], Short and Toffel [8], and Stafford [9] examine various aspects of EPA’s Audit 
Policy. 
6 Forty one states currently have some sort of environmental audit program. See Stafford [10, 11] and 
Khanna and Widyawati [12] for further discussion of these state policies.  
7 Most theoretical models of environmental auditing focus on the informational aspect of auditing (see, for 
example, Mishra et al. [13], Pfaff and Sanchirico [14], Friesen [15]). The theoretical models generally 
assume that environmental performance or compliance with environmental regulations includes a stochastic 
element. As a result, regulated entities cannot fully observe their levels of emissions or compliance status 
ex ante. By conducting an environmental audit, a regulated entity learns its true level of environmental 
performance and, where such performance is below the entity’s optimal level, can undertake corrective 
actions. 
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explore the impact of environmental auditing on compliance. Khanna and Widyawati 
[12] find higher contemporaneous compliance with Clean Air Act (CAA) regulations 
among facilities whose S&P 500 corporate parent indicates the presence of an 
environmental auditing program. Evans, Liu and Stafford [18] report no significant 
influence of auditing on long-term facility compliance with the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) among a sample of hazardous waste generators in Michigan. 
Earnhart and Harrington [19] find that more frequent auditing of a facility improves 
compliance with Clean Water Act (CWA) effluent limits for total suspended solids (TSS) 
but not biological oxygen demand (BOD).8  
Given their similar focus, the results of Khanna and Widyawati and Evans, Liu, 
and Stafford at first glance appear contradictory. Khanna and Widyawati find that 
environmental auditing improves compliance while Evans, Liu and Stafford find the 
opposite. However, upon closer consideration, the results of these two previous studies 
are not necessarily at odds because there are a number of differences between the 
analyses could individually or collectively drive the disparate findings. The studies focus 
on different environmental media (i.e., air versus hazardous waste) and different time 
frames (i.e., contemporaneous versus long-term). The samples are distinct with Khanna 
and Widyawti’s sample consisting of a set of facilities whose S&P 500 parent companies 
responded to the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRRC) survey on 
environmental management practices survey and Evans et al.’s sample including large 
and small hazardous waste generators in Michigan. Lastly, and for our purposes 
                                                        
8 An important feature of their study is its focus on a group of facilities that regularly conduct self-audits 
(i.e., chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES)). Thus, the results of their study cannot speak to whether the adoption of an audit 
program improves compliance compared to non-adoption. 
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potentially most important, the analyses measure environmental auditing at different 
levels of the firm’s decision-making structure. Khanna and Widyawati observe a firm-
level auditing measure, the presence or absence of an auditing program as indicated by 
the parent company, and assume uniform application of the auditing program to all 
facilities owned by the firm.9 That is, Khanna and Widyawati assume the firm adopts a 
standardized auditing policy (i.e., the firm either audits no facilities or audits all facilities 
in its portfolio). In contrast, Evans et al. observe auditing outcomes at the facility-level 
and are therefore not obliged to assume standardization.  
Similar issues about the use of firm-level vs. facility-level participation measures 
have arisen in the context of another voluntary environmental program, the government-
sponsored 33/50 program. The 33/50 program was developed by the EPA in the early 
nineties and set a goal of reducing aggregate emissions of 17 chemicals by 33% in 1992 
and by 50% in 1995, relative to the participant’s 1988 baseline. While regulated firms 
were invited to join the 33/50 program, not all facilities owned by such firms were active 
participants in the program.10 The 33/50 program is perhaps the most widely studied of 
all voluntary environmental programs, although to date there remains little consensus on 
the effect of participation in the 33/50 program on toxic emissions. Of course, the 
empirical studies that examine this question differ along multiple dimensions that could 
explain the discrepancy in results.  Like the studies of environmental auditing, two 
important dimensions are the level at which the participation outcome is measured and 
the level at which environmental performance is measured.  
                                                        
9 If the parent company does not indicate the presence of an auditing program, then Khanna and Widyawati 
assume no facilities owned by the parent company conduct an environmental audit. 
10 See Bi and Khanna [20] and Vidovic and Khanna [21] for a more thorough discussion of facility vs. firm 
participation. 
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Three studies, Khanna and Damon [22], Vidovic and Khanna [23], and Innes and 
Sam [24], use a firm-level measure of program participation provided by EPA (whether 
or not at least one facility committed to the program) as well as a firm-level measure of 
environmental performance (calculated by aggregating some measure of emissions across 
all facilities owned by a participating firm). Khanna and Damon and Innes and Sam find 
a reduction in emissions as a result of program participation while Vidovic and Khanna 
do not. In contrast, Gamper-Rabindran [25] conducts a facility-level analysis of 
emissions using EPA’s measure of firm-level participation and finds that participation 
decreases emissions only in a few select industries. The two most recent contributions to 
this literature, Bi and Khanna [20] and Vidovic and Khanna [21], use both a facility-level 
measure of 33/50 participation and a facility-level measure of performance. Interestingly, 
the facility-level participation data suggest that just over one-fifth of the facilities owned 
by 33/50 firms (i.e., parent company participants in 33/50) actually participated in the 
program and furthermore, most 33/50 firms had only a few participating facilities [20]. 
However, even with data at similar measurement levels, Bi and Khanna (2012) find a 
significant negative effect of facility participation on emissions of 33/50 chemicals while 
Vidovic and Khanna [21], looking at a more restrictive sample, find no significant effect 
of facility participation on facility emissions.   
 
3 Conceptual Model 
In this section we present a model of voluntary program adoption within a multi-
facility firm. A multi-facility firm may adopt various decision-making structures. Under a 
centralized structure, a single location (e.g., headquarters) makes and implements the 
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program adoption decision for all facilities. Under a decentralized structure, each facility 
independently chooses whether to adopt the voluntary program. A structure in between 
these two extremes might have one facility make adoption decisions for itself and for 
other nearby facilities (e.g., the firm may house an environmental compliance department 
in one facility for each region in which the firm operates). Regardless of the adopted 
structure, the decision-making may result in a standardized outcome in which either all 
facilities adopt or no facilities adopt. In this case, we say that the firm has a standardized 
adoption policy. Alternatively, adoption outcomes may be characterized by adoption at 
some facilities and not at others; we refer to this case as a heterogeneous adoption policy. 
Our model draws on the literature on the centralization-decentralization decision 
for multi-unit firms, itself a subset of the literature on organizational structure. Papers in 
this literature consider different incentives for a firm to centralize or decentralize its 
decision-making structure.  For example, in Sah and Stiglitz [26] the optimal 
organizational structure depends on the relative cost of Type I and Type II errors about 
the benefits of various projects. In Van Zandt [27] the optimal structure depends on the 
delay associated with distributing information across units relative to the benefits from 
increased information. Chang and Harrington [28] focus on the level of positive 
spillovers and mutual learning across units as well as the interplay between incentives of 
local managers to maximize unit profit and headquarters managers to maximize firm 
profit.  The model we develop is most like the model presented in Hunnicutt [29]. 
Hunnicutt examines the decision-making process of a multi-plant firm that must weigh 
the relative benefits of making production decisions at a single location and shipping 
bundles to various outlets relative to the benefit of having each outlet make its own 
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production decision. Under centralization, the firm achieves economies of scale but can 
make mistakes about the optimal amount of product for each outlet. Under decentralized 
production, mistakes are minimized but economies of scale are not achieved. Importantly, 
Hunnicutt also examines the conditions under which the firm finds it optimal to 
standardize the amount of product for each outlet. 
Our primary interest lies in understanding when a firm is likely to adopt 
standardized policy with respect to adoption of a voluntary program rather than a 
heterogenous policy. Our focus on the standardization decision is in part due to the fact 
that the underlying decision-making structure of the firm (e.g., centralized, decentralized) 
remains unobservable, while the adoption of a standardized or heterogeneous policy is 
observable (with appropriate data). Thus we develop a model of the decision to 
standardize for a multi-facility firm that owns N total facilities of 𝑀 ≥ 1 different types. 
Let 𝛾𝑚 denote the number of type-m facilities owned by the firm such that ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑀𝑚=1 = 𝑁. 
We refer to the firm as single-type if 𝑀 = 1, or multiple-type if 𝑀 > 1. Following 
Hunnicutt, we examine the decision to standardize under two organizational structures, 
centralization and decentralization. We assume that under centralization, the firm incurs 
lower adoption costs but observes the true benefit of adoption at each facility type with 
noise. Under decentralization, the firm observes the true benefit of adoption at each of its 
facilities but faces higher adoption costs.  
 Denote the benefit of adoption at a type-m facility as 𝑏𝑚. For 𝑀 > 1, we assume 
𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝑀 ≥ 0 so that the benefits of adoption at a type-1 facility are highest. 
For a given 𝑀, the larger is the difference between adoption at a type-1 facility (i.e., the 
highest benefit) and a type-M facility (i.e., the lowest benefit), the more diverse are the 𝑀 
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facility types owned by the firm. We use this difference, 𝑏1 − 𝑏𝑀, as a measure of the 
degree of heterogeneity among the facilities in a firm’s portfolio.   
Under decentralization, each facility observes its own benefit of adoption. The 
cost of adoption at a facility under decentralization is constant and equal to 𝑐. Under 
centralization, the single-type firm observes the true benefit of adoption at each of its 
facilities.11 In contrast, the multiple-type centralized firm lacks full information about 
each facility’s operations due to agency problems. As a result, the multi-facility firm fails 
to observe the true benefit of adoption at each facility type, which is either high (𝑏𝑚𝐻 ) or 
low (𝑏𝑚𝐿 ) with 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿  for each facility type m. The multiple-type centralized firm has 
prior probability 𝜆𝑚 that 𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻  for facility type m and knows the number of facilities 
of each type. The firm observes a signal of the benefit of adoption at each facility type 
(i.e., the same signal for all facilities of a given type).12 Let 𝑧𝑚 denote the signal the firm 
receives for a type-m facility where 𝑧𝑚 equals 𝑏𝑚𝐻  or 𝑏𝑚𝐿  according to the following 
probability distributions: 
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 |𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ) = 𝑝𝑚 
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 |𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻) = 1 − 𝑝𝑚 
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 |𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ) = 𝑞𝑚 
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 |𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ) = 1 − 𝑞𝑚.                                                         
11 This assumption is consistent with a single facility making decisions for all facilities.  This “headquarters 
facility” might, for example, house the single environmental compliance department for the firm.  In this 
case, even in the presence of agency problems arising through interactions with the headquarters facility 
and other facilities, the headquarters facility still has full information about its own benefit of adoption. 
Since facilities are identical, the benefit of adoption at the headquarters facility is equal to the benefit of 
adoption at any other facility. 
12 For example, the centralized firm may rely on reports provided by facility managers based on 
information the managers compile from various divisions within their facilities.  The organizational 
structure of the firm can create incentives for misreporting at various levels.  For example, Evans et al. [30] 
show that compensation determined by a rank-order tournament may encourage such malfeasance on the 
part of managers. 
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where 𝑝𝑚 > 𝑞𝑚. 
The firm benefits from centralization through a lower unit cost of adoption. The 
cost of adoption at a facility under centralization is equal to 𝛼𝑐 with 0 < 𝛼 < 1. The 
lower adoption cost under centralization may stem from the elimination of duplicated 
activities or from returns to specialization (e.g., using a single team of trained 
environmental compliance staff is less costly than providing such specialized training to 
staff onsite at each facility). 
 
3.1 The single-type firm’s decision 
We first consider the adoption decision of a single-type firm (i.e., 𝑀 = 1). Let 𝑏 
denote the benefit to the single-type firm of adoption at one of its facilities. The single-
type firm, under centralization or decentralization, will either adopt the program at all 
facilities or adopt for no facilities. That is, it chooses a standardized adoption policy.  
Under centralization, if the marginal benefit of adoption at a facility, 𝑏, exceeds 
the marginal cost of adoption, 𝛼𝑐, then the single-type firm maximizes its net benefits by 
adopting the program at all N facilities. Otherwise, the centralized single-type firm does 
not adopt the program at any facility. Under centralization, the net benefits of program 
adoption at all N facilities for the single-type firm are given by 
𝑁𝑁𝑐
1(𝑀 = 1) = 𝑏𝑁 − 𝛼𝑐𝑁. 
The subscript denotes the firm structure, c for centralized and d for decentralized, while 
the superscript indicates the single-type firm.  
Under decentralization, each facility will adopt the program provided 𝑏 > 𝑐. The 
net benefits to the decentralized single-type firm of adoption at all facilities is then 
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𝑁𝑁𝑑
1(𝑀 = 1) = 𝑏𝑁 − 𝑐𝑁. 
Notice that the total benefit of adoption at all facilities is the same under both structures. 
Given this and since 𝛼 < 1, the net benefits of adoption are higher under centralization 
for the single-type firm (i.e., 𝑁𝑁𝑐1(𝑀 = 1) > 𝑁𝑁𝑑1(𝑀 = 1)). Thus, a firm that owns 
identical facilities chooses a centralized structure and follows the straightforward 
adoption decision rule discussed above. Intuitively, the single-type firm enjoys lower 
costs of adoption under centralization without the associated risk of misestimating the 
benefits of adoption. For the single-type firm, the decision to adopt a program for all 
facilities versus no facilities is driven entirely by the benefits and costs of adoption under 
centralization. 
 
3.2 The mutiple-type firm’s decision 
Now consider a firm that owns 𝑀 > 1 types of facilities (i.e., a multiple-type 
firm). Under decentralization, the multiple-type firm adopts the program at all facilities 
only if the benefit of adoption a type-M facility exceeds the cost, 𝑏𝑀 ≥ 𝑐. Recall that the 
type-M facility has the lowest benefit of adoption so the decentralized multiple-type firm 
finds adoption at all facility types optimal only if the net benefits of adoption at a type-M 
facility are positive. The decentralized firm does not adopt the program at any facility if 
the cost of adoption exceeds the benefit of adoption at a type-1 facility (i.e., the highest 
benefit facility), 𝑐 > 𝑏1. If 𝑏1 ≥ 𝑐 > 𝑏𝑀, then the multiple-type firm prefers a 
heterogeneous adoption policy under decentralization. In other words, for standardization 
to be optimal for the multiple-type firm under decentralization, either 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ >
𝑏𝑀 ≥ 𝑐 or 𝑐 > 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝑀 must hold. This implies that as the difference in 
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benefits to adoption at the highest and lowest benefit facility types grows, the range of 
adoption costs for which a multiple-type firm finds standardization optimal under 
decentralization gets smaller. Thus, under decentralization, multi-facility firms whose 
portfolios of facilities exhibit higher degrees of heterogeneity are ceteris paribus less 
likely to employ standardized adoption policies.    
A more concrete two-firm example where the voluntary program in question is 
environmental auditing illustrates this result. Assume decentralized Firms A and B each 
own 100 total facilities of ten different types. Each firm owns 10 facilities of each type so 
that 𝛾𝑚 = 10 for 𝑚 = 1, … ,10. For firm A, a type-1 facility has a benefit of auditing 
equal to 10 and a type-10 facility has an auditing benefit of 1. The benefits of auditing for 
facility types 2 through 9 take integer values between 9 and 2 for firm A.  For firm B, a 
type-1 facility has a benefit of auditing equal to 6 and a type-10 facility has an auditing 
benefit of 5.  The benefits of auditing for facility types 2 through 9 take equally 
distributed values between 6 and 5. Given these assumptions, the mean benefit of 
auditing a facility is 5.5 for both firms but the difference between auditing the highest 
benefit facility and the lowest benefit facility (i.e., 𝑏1 − 𝑏𝑀) is only 1 for Firm B and is 9 
for Firm A. That is, Firm B exhibits a lower degree of heterogeneity than Firm A. Firm B 
finds standardization optimal when the cost of auditing is less than 5 or greater than 6 
whereas Firm A chooses to standardize only when the auditing cost is below 1 or above 
10. Thus, the range of auditing costs for which Firm A, the firm with a higher degree of 
heterogeneity, finds standardization optimal is less than the range of costs for which Firm 
B chooses a standardized auditing policy. 
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Now consider the decision facing the multiple-type firm under centralization. For 
a multiple-type firm in which (i) 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 for all facility types 𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀, or (ii) 
𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿  for all facility types, a standardized adoption policy is optimal. If (i) 
holds, then the firm adopts the program at all facilities. If (ii) holds, then the firm forgoes 
adoption at all facilities. The lack of full information has no impact on such a firm’s 
adoption decisions.  
The more interesting case is a firm that owns some facility types for which the 
benefits of adoption satisfy 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐿  (i.e., adoption is optimal for the “high” m-
type but not for the “low” m-type). In what follows, we restrict attention to this case. The 
centralized firm bases its adoption decision for facility types with 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐿  on the 
expected benefits of adoption conditional on the signal the firm receives. The ranking of 
facility types from highest to lowest based on the true benefits of adoption need not 
coincide with the ranking of facility types from highest to lowest based on the conditional 
expected benefits of adoption. The conditional expected benefit of adoption at a type-m 
facility depends on the posterior probability distribution given by: 
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 |𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻) = 𝑝𝑚𝜆𝑚𝑝𝑚𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚(1 − 𝜆𝑚) 
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 |𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻) = 𝑞𝑚(1 − 𝜆𝑚)𝑝𝑚𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚(1 − 𝜆𝑚) 
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 |𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ) = (1− 𝑝𝑚)𝜆𝑚(1 − 𝑞𝑚)(1− 𝜆𝑚) + (1− 𝑝𝑚)𝜆𝑚 
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 |𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ) = (1− 𝑞𝑚)(1− 𝜆𝑚)(1− 𝑞𝑚)(1− 𝜆𝑚) + (1− 𝑝𝑚)𝜆𝑚. 
Conditional on observing the signal 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 , the expected benefit of adoption at a type-
m facility is given in expression (1): 
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𝐸(𝑏𝑚|𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐻) = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 𝑝𝑚𝜆𝑚𝑝𝑚𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚(1− 𝜆𝑚) + 𝑏𝑚𝐿 𝑞𝑚(1− 𝜆𝑚)𝑝𝑚𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚(1− 𝜆𝑚).   (1) 
If instead the centralized firm observes 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 , then the conditional expected benefit of 
adoption at a type-m facility equals: 
𝐸(𝑏𝑚|𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ) = 𝑏𝑚𝐻 (1− 𝑝𝑚)𝜆𝑚(1− 𝑞𝑚)(1− 𝜆𝑚) + (1− 𝑝𝑚)𝜆𝑚 
                           +𝑏𝑚𝐿 (1− 𝑞𝑚)(1− 𝜆𝑚)(1− 𝑞𝑚)(1− 𝜆𝑚) + (1− 𝑝𝑚)𝜆𝑚 .       (2) 
The centralized multiple-type firm adopts the program at all type-m facilities if 
𝐸(𝑏𝑚|𝑧𝑚) ≥ 𝛼𝑐 where 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚𝐿 , 𝑏𝑚𝐻 . Otherwise, the firm forgoes adoption at all type-m 
facilities. 
The intuition for establishing the conditions under which the centralized firm 
chooses a standardized adoption policy are similar to that for the decentralized firm with 
one important difference. The decentralized firm bases its adoption decision on the 
known benefits of adoption whereas the centralized firm uses the conditional expected 
benefits of adoption. Since the ranking of facility types based on the true benefits of 
adoption may differ from the ranking based on the conditional expected benefits of 
adoption, the set of facilities adopting the program under centralization may differ from 
those that adopt under decentralization. 
The centralized firm adopts the program at all facilities if it owns no facility types 
such that 𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿  and, among those facilities with 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐿 , the conditional 
expected benefit of adoption at the facility type with the lowest conditional expected 
benefit exceeds the adoption cost. The centralized firm adopts the program at no facilities 
if it owns no facility types such that 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 and, among those facilities with 
𝑏𝑚
𝐻 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐿 , if the conditional expected benefit of adoption at the facility type with 
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the highest conditional expected benefit is less than the cost of adoption. Finally, if 
neither of these holds, then the centralized firm opts for a heterogeneous adoption 
policy.13 This implies that as the difference in conditional expected benefits of adoption 
at the facility type with the highest conditional expected benefit and at the facility type 
with the lowest conditional expected benefit grows, the range of adoption costs for which 
a multiple-type centralized firm finds standardization optimal gets smaller. Since the 
conditional expected benefit for facility type m is increasing in 𝑏𝑚𝐿  and 𝑏𝑚𝐻 , the 
centralized multi-facility firm whose portfolio of facilities exhibits a higher degree of 
heterogeneity is ceteris paribus less likely to adopt a standardized adoption policy. 
Overall, the model generates two primary hypotheses with respect to firm 
characteristics and the likelihood that a firm will employ a standardized adoption policy. 
First, the model implies that multi-facility firms are less likely to employ a standardized 
adoption policy if their facilities exhibit substantial heterogeneity. Second, a standardized 
adoption policy is more likely among multi-facility firms for which the costs of adoption 
are either prohibitively high or negligible, relative to the benefits of adoption. These 
intuitive results hold whether the firm has adopted a centralized or decentralized decision 
making structure. 
 
4. Firm-level analysis of standardization in auditing outcomes 
Testing the hypotheses about standardization that arise from our conceptual model 
requires facility-level data on voluntary program adoption. For our analysis, we consider 
adoption of an environmental audit program. In general, national data on environmental                                                         
13 As mentioned above, standardization is also optimal when (i) 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿 ≥ 𝛼𝑐 for all facility types 
𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀, or (ii)  𝛼𝑐 > 𝑏𝑚𝐻 ≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐿  for all facility types.   
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auditing are difficult to obtain due in part to the fact that EPA does not require regulated 
entities to indicate the presence of audit programs. Fortunately, Michigan, like many 
other states, has its own environmental auditing program. Under the provisions of 
Michigan’s audit policy, which began in 1997, audit documents are privileged and 
voluntary disclosures are eligible for immunity from penalties.14 One rather unique 
feature of Michigan’s audit policy is that regulated entities must provide advance notice 
of an audit to receive penalty immunity.15 Specifically, the facility must file an “intent-to-
audit” notice that identifies the facility at which the audit will be conducted, indicates the 
time frame for the audit, and states the general scope of the audit.16  
We obtained a list of the intent-to-audit notices filed with the DEQ between 1998 
and 2003. The data include the company and facility name, a mailing address, and the 
date the notice was filed. We used this information to match each facility to EPA’s 
Facility Registry System (FRS) to identify the federal facility identification number and 
to determine the media programs under which the facility is regulated. Our empirical 
analysis focuses on facilities regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in Michigan and 
the firms that own these facilities. We obtained data on facility characteristics from 
EPA’s Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) Facility Subsystem (or AFS) 
database. 17 Using DUNS numbers (when available) and owner names from the FRS, 
                                                        
14 In addition to Michigan, 17 other states provide audit privilege and immunity. 
15 To our knowledge the only other state that requires prior notification is Texas. 
16 While it is possible that a facility might conduct an environmental audit without first notifying the DEQ, 
Michigan provides strong incentives for facilities to file intent-to-audit notices; a primary benefit of 
auditing is the potential for penalty mitigation and this benefit is available only to auditing facilities that 
submit the required intent-to-audit notice. Additionally, since Michigan grants legal privilege to all 
environmental auditing documents, entities should not be reluctant to disclose environmental audits.  See 
Evans et al. [18] for further discussion of these data. 
17 The AFS database was downloaded from EPA’s Envirofacts System in August 2007. AFS also lists 3 
“portable sources” located in Michigan, but we excluded them from this analysis since they do not have a 
fixed facility location.  
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along with company name from the AFS, we matched CAA-regulated facilities in 
Michigan that were owned by the same firm.18 In order to empirically explore the role of 
heterogeneity, we restrict attention to multi-facility firms, of which we have 171 
represented in our data. These 171 firms own a total of 730 facilities.  
Our first empirical analysis explores the factors that lead a firm to choose a 
standardized adoption policy. Thus the dependent variable in the analysis is 
Standardization, which equals one if either all facilities owned by a firm audit or if none 
of the facilities owned by the firm audit. Otherwise, Standardization equals zero. We 
observe standardization for 155 firms (about 90%), which accounts for 590 facilities 
(81%). For the remaining 10 percent of firms, we observe heterogeneous auditing among 
their 140 facilities. Note that since our data contain facilities located in a single state, the 
degree of standardization we observe is likely to be higher than if our dataset included 
facilities located in several states. Since policies on audit privilege and audit immunity 
vary by state, firms that operate in multiple states may be more likely to adopt a 
standardized audit policy at their facilities within a given state (versus adopting a 
standardized policy at all of their facilities). 
We estimate a simple probit regression for Standardization. The first testable 
implication of our conceptual model is that higher levels of heterogeneity among a firm’s 
facilities will decrease the likelihood that the firm uses a standardized adoption policy. 
Thus, we need to operationalize the concept of heterogeneity from our theoretical model. 
In the model heterogeneity is represented as the difference in the benefits of auditing the 
                                                        
18 As a first pass, we electronically matched facilities owned by the same firm using DUNS numbers and 
company names but since the owner and company name fields do not have standardized formats (e.g., no 
standard abbreviations or punctuation rules), we made many of the matches manually for facilities with 
missing DUNS numbers.   
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facilities that have the highest benefit from auditing and the facilities that have the 
lowest. Because we don’t observe the benefits of auditing different facility types, our 
empirical measures of heterogeneity rely on observable facility characteristics that may 
proxy for underlying differences in the benefits of auditing different facilities.19 We 
create three firm-level measures of heterogeneity. Each measure captures a different 
dimension of heterogeneity and takes a value between zero and one where zero denotes a 
homogeneous portfolio of firms with respect to that characteristic.20 The first measure, 
Industry heterogeneity, focuses on the nature of production at each facility as measured 
by the up to three 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes associated with 
the facility. If the sequence of 4-digit SIC codes is identical for all facilities in the firm’s 
portfolio, then Industry heterogeneity equals zero. If each facility in the firm’s portfolio 
has a unique sequence of 4-digit SIC codes, then Industry heterogeneity is equal to one.21 
If the firm’s portfolio contains a mix of unique and repeated sequences of SIC codes 
among its facilities, then Industry heterogeneity takes some value between zero and one. 
In general, a higher value (closer to one) of Industry heterogeneity indicates more 
diversity among the firm’s facilities in terms of their production activities.  
Our second measure, Regulatory heterogeneity, examines the nature of the 
regulatory environment at the facilities owned by a firm. While our analysis only includes 
facilities regulated under the CAA, our dataset contains information on other 
environmental programs to which the facility is subject. We create five indicator 
                                                        
19 In our theoretical model, we chose to model heterogeneity in benefits while assuming constant costs 
across facilities.  However, similar insights arise in a model with heterogeneity in costs and constant 
benefits. 
20 See the appendix for a more detailed description of these measures.  
21 Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use an alternative industry heterogeneity measure created 
with the sequence of 2-digit SIC codes. 
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variables from this information. The first two variables indicate that the facility is subject 
to the provisions of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) or the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA), respectively. The remaining variables indicate that the 
facility shows up in an EPA database, the Permit Compliance System (PCS), the 
Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS), or the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), respectively. 
PCS and ICIS designate facilities that are registered with EPA’s federal enforcement and 
compliance and that hold National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. A 
facility in CERCLIS is on (or being considered for) Superfund’s National Priorities 
List. Regulatory heterogeneity measures the diversity among facilities in terms of the 
sequence of these five indicator variables. If the sequence of these five indicator variables 
is the same for all facilities in the firm’s portfolio (i.e., the facilities face the same 
environmental regulatory environment), then Regulatory heterogeneity equals zero. A 
value closer to one indicates more diversity among the firm’s facilities in terms of their 
regulatory exposure. 
Our final measure, Size heterogeneity, assesses the degree of heterogeneity in 
terms of the size of the facilities owned by the firm, as measured by the number of 
employees at the facilities.22 To construct this measure, we first create a categorical 
variable to characterize the number of employees at the facility as less than or equal to 
10, greater than 10 but less than or equal to 100, greater than 100 but less than or equal to 
500, or greater than 500. Size heterogeneity equals zero if all facilities in the firm’s                                                         
22 The AFS provides a variable described as the number of employees at the facility.  However, this 
variable takes a value of zero for a large fraction of facilities.  If we exclude our size heterogeneity measure 
from the firm-level analysis below, our results with respect to the other included variables are unchanged.  
Alternatively, if we assume these zeros are in fact missing values, while our sample size decreases, our 
results are qualitatively similar. 
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portfolio have the same value for this categorical variable and one if each facility in the 
firm’s portfolio has a unique value for this categorical variable. Thus, values of Size 
heterogeneity closer to one indicate more diversity among the firm’s facilities in terms of 
facility size. If the degree of heterogeneity discourages adoption of standardized auditing 
policies, then we expect negative and significant coefficients on these three heterogeneity 
measures in our probit models.  
 Our final measure of heterogeneity is intended to capture other sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity. We argue that a firm whose portfolio includes a larger number 
of facilities is more likely to exhibit heterogeneity among its facilities than a firm owning 
a small number of facilities. We acknowledge that # facilities is a rough proxy since the 
number of facilities owned by a firm may also affect the firm’s incentives for 
standardization through other channels (e.g., by affecting the benefits or costs of 
auditing). This means that our empirical results with respect to this variable will not 
allow us to confirm or refute our theoretical prediction regarding heterogeneity.   
Recall that our model also predicts that the costs and benefits of auditing affect 
incentives to standardize. In particular, sufficiently high or low benefits relative to the 
costs of auditing may make auditing all firms or no firms optimal (i.e., may encourage 
standardization). Unfortunately, the benefits and costs of auditing are unobservable to 
outsiders. Therefore, to proxy for the relative benefits and costs of auditing, we use a 
dummy variable, Public, that equals one if the firm is publicly traded and zero otherwise. 
We argue that publicly traded firms face pressure from consumers and investors to 
comply with environmental regulations that privately held firms do not feel. This is 
consistent with Henriques and Sadorsky’s [31] finding that firms are more likely to 
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formulate an environmental plan if they face pressure on environmental issues from 
shareholders. Similarly, Earnhart and Harrington [19] argue that publicly traded firms 
may have stronger incentives to comply with environmental regulations because they 
enjoy greater access to external financing, which may reduce costs, and/or face greater 
pressure from investors for good environmental performance, which may increase 
benefits. However, since standardization equals one when the firm audits all firms or 
audits no firms, our model does not offer a clear prediction on the expected sign of the 
estimated coefficient on Public in our probit model. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics as well as the results of our probit analysis. 
The first column reports means and standard deviations. While the sample average for 
Industry heterogeneity is 0.67, 35 firms (about 20%) are homogenous along this 
dimension and 98 firms (about 57%) have a value of Industry heterogeneity equal to one. 
52 firms are homogeneous with respect to regulatory heterogeneity and 66 firms have the 
maximum value of regulatory heterogeneity. With respect to size, 71 firms are 
homogeneous and 50 firms are maximally heterogeneous. Thirty percent of the firms in 
our sample are publicly traded and the average firm has just over four facilities in its 
Michigan CAA portfolio (although the median number of facilities is two).  
The third column in Table 1 reports estimated coefficients and robust standard 
errors from our probit model while the forth column reports conditional marginal effects 
and standard errors for the probit obtained using the Delta method. The negative and 
significant coefficients on Industry heterogeneity and Regulatory heterogeneity are 
consistent with the model’s prediction that heterogeneity should reduce the likelihood of 
standardization at a multi-facility firm. The coefficient on Size heterogeneity is also 
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negative, as expected, but not significantly different from zero. The conditional marginal 
effect for Industry heterogeneity suggests that the most heterogeneous firm (i.e., Industry 
heterogeneity=1) is 2.6 percentage points less likely to standardize than the homogeneous 
firm (p-value=0.058). In terms of regulatory heterogeneity, the most heterogeneous firm 
is 3.6 percentage points less likely to standardize than the firm with Regulatory 
heterogeneity equal to zero (p-value=0.014). Standardization is also less likely among 
publicly traded firms; publicly traded firms are 5 percentage points less likely to 
standardize than privately held firms. If publicly held firms are likely to have 
significantly high benefits (perhaps because they face investor pressure), then we may 
expect them to be more likely to audit all firms relative to adopting a heterogeneous 
auditing policy. However, we would simultaneously expect them to be less likely to audit 
no facilities relative to auditing some but not all facilities. The negative and significant 
coefficient on Public is consistent with the latter effect dominating. Lastly, the 
probability of standardization decreases with the number of facilities owned by the firm 
although the estimated conditional marginal effect is small.  
To provide some additional evidence that the variables we include in our probit 
model are reasonable proxies for the underlying measures from our model, we estimate a 
fractional logit model [32], in which the dependent variable is the fraction of its facilities 
the firm audits. We include the same independent variables as in our standardization 
probit. Results of the fractional logit model are reported in the final column of Table 1. 
Recall that our model suggests that the firm’s decision of which facility types to audit 
given a heterogeneous auditing policy is driven exclusively by the benefits (or expected 
benefits) and the costs of auditing while heterogeneity affects whether a firm will use a 
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standardized policy. Thus, our theory does not predict a relationship between 
heterogeneity and the fraction of facilities that audit. As shown in the final column of 
Table 1, we confirm no statistically significant effect of heterogeneity on the fraction of 
facilities that audit. However, the positive and significant coefficient on Public indicates 
that, relative to privately held firms, publicly traded firms audit a higher percentage of 
their facilities, perhaps because the benefits of doing so are higher. The positive 
coefficient on # facilities (p-value = 0.104) suggests that larger firms audit a higher 
fraction of their facilities, perhaps due to lower auditing costs.  
What are the implications of our firm-level analysis for empirical models of 
environmental auditing? First, our results suggest that the measurement error introduced 
by assigning the same auditing outcome to all facilities owned by a firm, as is necessary 
with only a firm-level auditing outcome, is likely to be greater for firms whose facilities 
are more diverse. To provide further evidence of this, we first explore the degree of 
misalignment between our facility-level audit measure and two candidate firm-level audit 
measures. Firm audit1 equals one if the firm owns at least one facility that submitted an 
intent-to-audit notice and zero otherwise and Firm audit2 equals one if all of the facilities 
owned by the firm submitted intent-to-audit notices and zero otherwise.23 Specifically, 
we ask: For how many facilities would we incorrectly assign an auditing outcome were 
we to substitute facility-level audit data with a firm-level audit measure? For both 
measures, the firm-level measure is different than the facility-level measure for about 
                                                        
23 It remains possible that (1) a firm with Firm audit1 equal to zero audits at one of its facilities located 
outside the state of Michigan or (2) a firm with Firm audit2 equal to one chooses not to audit at a facility 
located in another state.  Our two firm-level audit measures are defined based on the sample of facilities we 
observe, which are all located in Michigan. 
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10% of the 730 facilities owned by the firms in our analysis.24 Table 2 report means and 
standard deviations for our three heterogeneity measures by whether or not the facility- 
and firm-level audit measures are equal. If more heterogeneity is associated with more 
measurement error as suggested by the theory, then we expect the mean heterogeneity to 
be higher among observations in which the facility- and firm-level measures differ. The 
table confirms this. 
Ultimately we do not know whether either of these firm-level audit measures 
would align with a firm-level auditing outcome obtained from a survey of firms, as used 
in Khanna and Widyawati [12]. Regardless, this exercise reinforces the need for caution 
in assuming complete standardization in auditing outcomes among facilities owned by 
the same firm. Additionally, our findings hint at the potential importance of controlling 
for firm characteristics that might influence the standardization decision in analyses of 
any voluntary program, including environmental auditing. In the next section, we explore 
the implications of this second insight in a facility-level analysis of the impact of 
environmental auditing on compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA).  
 
5. A facility-level analysis of environmental auditing  
Our facility-level analysis examines the factors that encourage environmental 
auditing at a facility as well as the impact of auditing on the facility’s long term 
compliance with the CAA. In particular, we examine the potential for the explicit 
recognition of firms’ differential incentives for standardization in a facility-level 
                                                        
24 The distributions of both Firm audit1 and Firm audit2 are significantly different from the facility-level 
audit measure (both with p-value=0.00).   
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empirical analysis of environmental auditing to lead to different conclusions regarding 
the effectiveness of environmental auditing. To do so, we expand our dataset beyond the 
multi-facility firms included in our analysis above to include stand-alone facilities.25 We 
extract additional facility characteristics, enforcement history, and current compliance 
status from the AFS. We also linked the AFS database to EPA’s Enforcement and 
Compliance History Online (ECHO) and Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis 
(IDEA) databases to obtain additional enforcement and compliance measures.  
We identify an audit at a facility if the facility submitted at least one intent-to-
audit notice between 1998 and 2003. In this case, the variable Facility audit equals one 
for the facility. Otherwise, we do not measure an audit at the facility and Facility audit 
equals zero. Of the 2811 facilities included in our analysis, 111 (about 4%) submitted 
intent-to-audit notices during the time frame we consider.26  
The CAA requires facilities to self-report their compliance status on an on-going 
basis (i.e., each quarter).27 We use these data to create a binary compliance variable, 
Comply, which equals one if the facility is in compliance for each of the 12 quarters 
between the second quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2007.28 Comply equals zero if 
                                                        
25 Note that due to missing data for some of the variables included in our facility-level analysis not all of 
the 730 facilities whose parent companies are included in our firm-level analysis (Section 4) are present in 
our facility-level analysis.  542 facilities whose firms are included in our firm-level analysis are present in 
the sample used in our facility-level analysis. 
26 The 4 percent audit rate is roughly consistent with Potoski and Prakash’s [33] estimate that 
approximately 4 percent of “major” CAA-regulated facilities participate in the ISO14001 certification 
program, a program which requires (among other things) adoption of an environmental auditing protocol. 
27 The self-reported nature of the compliance data introduces the potential for bias.  Existing evidence on 
the accuracy of self-reported environmental compliance data is mixed.  For example, deMarchi and 
Hamilton [34] find reporting irregularities in self-reported data from the Toxics Release Inventory but these 
data are not used by regulators for enforcement purposes.  Analyses of self-reported compliance measures 
that are used for enforcement purposes have been unable to reject the accuracy of these data [35, 36].  The 
use of self-reported data for enforcement purposes provides strong incentives, such as criminal fines, to 
encourage truthful reporting.  The CAA self-reported data are used for enforcement.   
28 Facilities are included in our analysis provided we observe compliance or non-compliance status for all 
12 quarters.  Facilities with missing compliance data during this time period are excluded from our 
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the facility is out of compliance for at least one of these 12 quarters. In focusing on the 
longer run impacts of auditing on compliance with the CAA, our analysis differs from 
Khanna and Widyawati [12], who examine contemporaneous compliance effects. 
A key concern in conducting an empirical analysis of the effect of audits on 
compliance behavior is the potential for endogeneity. Specifically, because violations 
discovered during the course of an audit are eligible for penalty mitigation (with the 
possibility of a complete waiver of penalties), facilities that are concerned that they are 
non-compliant may be more likely to implement an environmental auditing program. If 
so, the audit decision would be correlated with factors that affect the compliance status of 
the facility. However, while Khanna and Widyawati [12] could not reject the hypothesis 
that their audit variable was endogenous, both Evans at al. [18] and Earnhart and 
Harrington [19] found no evidence that their audit measure was endogenous 
 Even though the endogeneity of the auditing measure may be less of a concern in 
this analysis given our emphasis on the longer run effects of auditing, to address the 
possibility for endogeneity we follow Khanna and Widyawati by estimating a 
simultaneous recursive bivariate probit model for the two latent binary dependent 
variables, Facility audit and Comply. 29 We follow both Evans et al. [18] and Khanna and 
Widyawati [12] in selecting facility- and county-level variables for inclusion in the audit 
and compliance equations. We can broadly classify these variables as those related to the 
facility’s characteristics, its inspection and compliance history, the stringency of the CAA                                                                                                                                                                      
analysis.  We re-estimated our models including all facilities with at least 2 quarters of data in this time 
period and we obtain qualitatively similar results. 
29 Maddala [37] derives the full information maximum likelihood estimator for this model, which we 
estimate in Stata.  According to Wilde [38], the model is identified with sufficient variation in the 
independent variables.  In our previous work, we used exclusion restrictions for identification.  
Unfortunately we are unable to find valid exclusion restrictions for this application thus we adopt Khanna 
and Widyawati’s identification strategy, which follows Wilde [38]. 
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regulations to which the facility is subject, its regulatory exposure under non-CAA 
environmental programs, and county-level characteristics for the county in which the 
facility is located. Table 3 provides variable descriptions and summary statistics.30 
We minimize our discussion of these facility- and county-level variables in order 
to focus on the primary variables of interest for motivating our model of the firm’s 
standardization decision. Based on our conceptual model, we expect the incentives for 
standardization to vary systematically across firms. Our empirical analysis in section 4 
confirms that the incentives for adopting a standardized auditing policy vary between 
publicly traded and privately held firms, and by the degree of heterogeneity among the 
facilities owned by the firm. Here, we explore the potential implications of recognizing 
these differences in a facility-level analysis of environmental auditing by including two 
relevant firm-level controls. The first variable, Multifacility, takes the value of one if the 
firm owns more than one CAA-regulated facility in Michigan. The second variable, 
Public, equals one if the firm that owns the facility (i.e., the facility’s parent company) is 
publicly-traded and zero if it is privately held. Ten percent of facilities in our sample are 
owned by publicly-traded firms while about 20 percent belong to a multi-facility firm. 
Table 4 reports the results of our facility-level bivariate probit analysis. The 
results of the audit and compliance equations are given in the left-hand and right-hand 
panels, respectively. We report results for two specifications that differ in terms of 
whether or not we include the two firm-level measures. Because Model I excludes these 
firm-level controls, it is similar to those considered in previous analyses of environmental 
                                                        
30 See Section 4 for a description of the regulatory program acronyms listed in Table 1. 
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auditing.31  Model II is identical to Model I other than the inclusion of Public and 
Multifacility.32 Model I is reported in the second and fourth columns while Model II is 
reported in the third and fifth columns. 
The results of Models I and II are broadly consistent with each other and with past 
analyses with respect to the variables that measure facility- and county-level 
characteristics. However, the inclusion of Public and Multifacility in Model II results in 
two important differences between the results. First, the primary variable of interest in the 
compliance equation, Audit, is positive and significant in Model I but insignificant (and 
negative) in Model II. The former suggests that, controlling for the endogeneity of Audit, 
auditing facilities are more likely to be in compliance. The latter result suggests no 
significant impact of auditing on long-term compliance. Second, the estimate for ρ  in 
Model I is negative and significant, which suggests a correlation between the unobserved 
factors that affect Audit and Comply. The estimate for ρ  is insignificant in Model II. 
Along both of these dimensions, Model I is consistent with the findings of Khanna and 
Widyawati [12] while Model II aligns with Evans et al.’s [18] results. A Wald test 
confirms that we are able to reject the null hypothesis that Public and Multifacility are 
jointly equal to zero ( ( ) 92.4042 =χ , p-value = 0.00). Thus, including these variables 
significantly improves the fit of the model. If, as we argue, these variables are related to 
                                                        
31 This analysis and that of Khanna and Widywati [12] examine the effects of auditing on compliance with 
the CAA.  However, the significant differences between the dataset we use here and the dataset used by 
Khanna and Widyawati make replicating their specifications unfeasible.  While our data are closer to the 
sample used by Evans et al. [18] as both samples focus on facilities in Michigan, Evans et al.’s sample 
includes manufacturing facilities regulated under RCRA while our sample restricts attention to CAA-
regulated facilities.   
32 We get the qualitatively same results if we use all three firm-level heterogeneity measures in place of 
Multifacility. 
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the firm’s incentives for standardization, then our results suggest that such controls are 
important in analyses of environmental auditing.  
 
6. Discussion 
As external observers, researchers rely on data provided by regulated entities, 
through surveys or through self-reports, or by regulators to measure participation in 
voluntary programs and related outcomes. Often such data are only available at the firm-
level even though program adoption may happen at the facility-level. When researchers 
use a firm-level measure of participation, they are making an assumption, which often 
goes unstated, regarding the nature of decision-making within the regulated entity. In 
particular they are assuming that the firm has a standardized adoption policy. However, 
our theoretical model shows that it may not be optimal for a firm to adopt a standardized 
policy.  We find that the level of heterogeneity among a firm’s facilities is inversely 
related to the likelihood that a standardized policy is optimal.  However, at multi-facility 
firms with relatively high or low benefits from adoption, a firm is more likely to adopt a 
standardized policy.  
Because our theoretical analysis suggests that assigning the same auditing 
outcome for all facilities owned by the same firm (i.e., assuming standardization) is more 
problematic for certain firms (e.g., those whose facilities exhibit more heterogeneity), we 
examine the implications for the model using the adoption of a voluntary environmental 
audit program as a case study. Using a dataset of CAA-regulated firms in Michigan, we 
analyze the decision to standardize the adoption of environmental audits at the firm’s 
regulated facilities in Michigan. We find that our measures of firm heterogeneity and 
 33 
proxies for the relative benefits from auditing do have statistically significant impacts on 
the standardization decision and that those effects are consistent with the theory.  
Next we examine whether accounting for those firm-level factors that influence 
the standardization decision affects the results of an empirical analysis of the effect of 
environmental auditing on facility compliance. Using a facility-level data set on both 
environmental audit adoption and facility compliance with the CAA, we find that the 
estimated impact of auditing on compliance depends on whether or not we include 
controls for firm incentives to adopt a standardized auditing policy. When such controls 
are excluded, our empirical results suggest a positive impact of auditing on long-run 
compliance with the CAA. This effect disappears once these controls are added. Of 
course, our controls are not perfect measures of firm incentives for standardization. 
However, as in our dataset, many datasets are likely to contain a handful of observable 
firm characteristics that may be related to this decision and can therefore be used as 
proxies.  
While our analysis examines the issue of standardization within the context of 
environmental auditing, the decision to adopt an environmental auditing program shares 
many aspects with the decision to participate in other voluntary environmental programs. 
Thus, we believe that the lessons from our analysis have relevance for empirical analyses 
of the impact on environmental performance of participation in other voluntary 
environmental programs. For example, the various empirical analyses of EPA’s 33/50 
program reach different conclusions regarding the effectiveness of participation in 
improving environmental performance.  While these studies vary across a number of 
dimensions, one key dimension is whether participation is measured at the firm- or 
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facility-level.  Interestingly, neither of the two studies that examine the effect of facility-
level participation on facility-level compliance [20, 21] include firm-level controls.  
While three of the four studies that use a firm-level measure of adoption (and assume that 
participation is standardized) include the number of facilities owned by the firm into their 
analyses, none of them include measures of heterogeneity or the relative benefit of the 
program. We believe that including more firm-level controls might help to reconcile 
some of the mixed results in this literature. 
To help policy makers effectively assess the extent to which participation in 
voluntary programs can substitute for more traditional compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms, it is important to conduct careful studies of such programs.  Given the 
findings of our study, we recommend that future analyses of voluntary environmental 
program include facility-level participation measures as well as firm-level controls, when 
available.  If facility-level measures are not available, we urge researchers to control for 
the factors that make a firm more likely to standardize including the heterogeneity of the 
facilities in the firm’s portfolio.
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Table 1. Results of firm-level empirical analysis 
 
  Probit results—dependent 
variable is Standardization 
Fractional logit 
results—dependent 
variable is fraction 
of facilities audited 
 Sample 
mean  
(standard 
deviation) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard error) 
Conditional 
marginal effect 
(Delta-method 
standard error) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(robust standard 
error) 
Industry 
heterogeneity 
0.67 
(0.42) 
-0.89* 
(0.46) 
-0.026 
(0.014) 
0.047 
(0.73) 
Regulatory 
heterogeneity 
0.51 
(0.43) 
-0.88* 
(0.41) 
-0.036* 
(0.015) 
0.15 
(0.76) 
Size 
heterogeneity 
0.39 
(0.42) 
-0.091 
(0.80) 
-0.0080 
(0.031) 
0.37 
(0.64) 
Public 0.30 
(0.46) 
-0.80** 
(0.31) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
0.95* 
(0.50) 
# facilities 4.27 
(6.47) 
-0.060** 
(0.018) 
-0.0057** 
(0.0022) 
0.045 
(0.027) 
Constant -- 3.25** 
(0.53) 
-- -3.62** 
(1.02) 
N=171, pseudo R2=0.22 
For all variables except # facilities, conditional marginal effects are calculated as the 
response for the change of going from a value of zero to a value of one (at the means of 
the other variables). For # facilities, the conditional marginal effect is calculated at the 
means of all the variables. * indicates significance at 10% and ** indicates significance at 
5%. 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations for firm-level heterogeneity measures by 
alignment between facility- and firm-level audit measures 
 
Heterogeneity 
measure 
Firm audit measure 
Firm audit 1 (at least one 
facility audits) 
Firm audit 2 (all facilities audit) 
Firm-level 
measure equal 
to facility-
level measure 
Firm-level 
measure not 
equal to 
facility-level 
measure 
Firm-level 
measure equal 
to facility-
level measure 
Firm-level 
measure not 
equal to 
facility-level 
measure 
Industry 
heterogeneity 
0.52 
(0.016) 
0.68 
(0.032) 
0.52 
(0.016) 
0.74 
(0.025) 
Regulatory 
heterogeneity 
0.40 
(0.015) 
0.68 
(0.21) 
0.40 
(0.015) 
0.73 
(0.020) 
Size heterogeneity 0.30 
(0.014) 
0.46 
(0.024) 
0.31 
(0.014) 
0.41 
(0.024) 
Table reports means and standard deviations for heterogeneity measure listed in each row 
by whether or not the facility-level audit measure is the same as the firm-level audit 
measure for two different audit measures.  All pairwise differences in means (i.e., 
between columns 2 and 3, 4 and 5) are significantly different at the 5% level.   
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Table 3. Variable description and summary statistics for facility-level analysis of 
environmental auditing 
Variable name Variable description Mean Standard 
deviation 
Facility-level variables 
Comply = 1 if facility reported complete compliance from 2nd 
quarter 2004 through 1st quarter 2007, = 0 if facility was 
out of compliance for one or more quarters 
0.80 0.40 
Facility Audit = 1 if facility submitted at least one intent to audit notice 
between 1998 and 2003 
0.040 0.19 
Employees Number of employees at facility 169.24 1013.35 
Manufacturing = 1 if facility is classified as manufacturing (SIC codes 
20 – 39) 
0.55 0.50 
Past inspection = 1 if facility was inspected at least once between 1994 
and 1997 
0.42 0.49 
Count past 
inspection 
Number of times facility was inspected between 1994 
and 1998 
0.97 1.62 
Past violation = 1 if the facility was cited for a violation at least once 
between 1994 and 1998 
0.049 0.22 
Past penalties Total CAA penalties paid from 1994 to 1998, in $1,000s 31.91 571.45 
Major = 1 if facility is classified as a major air source 0.15 0.36 
MACT = 1 if facility is subject to MACT (maximum achievable 
control technology). 
0.071 0.26 
PSD = 1 if facility is subject to PSD (prevention of significant 
deterioration) 
0.049 0.22 
NSR = 1 if facility is subject to NSR (new source review) 0.0068 0.082 
NSPS = 1 if facility is subject to NSPS (new source 
performance standards) 
0.17 0.38 
SIP = 1 if facility is classified as a SIP (state implementation 
plan) source 
0.94 0.24 
CFC = 1 if facility is subject to CFC tracking 0.052 0.22 
CERCLIS =1 if the facility is tracked in CERCLIS  0.015 0.12 
ICIS = 1 if facility is tracked ICIS  0.13 0.34 
PCS =1 if the facility is tracked in PCS  0.11 0.32 
RCRA = 1 if facility is regulated under RCRA 0.57 0.49 
TRI =1 if the facility is subject to TRI reporting 0.31 0.46 
County-level variables 
Nonattainment = 1 if facility is located in county that was classified as 
non-attainment for ozone in 2004 
0.65 0.48 
County 
conservancy  
Number of individuals in the county that belonged to the 
Nature Conservancy in 2005 per 1000 residents 
2.49 1.05 
County 
Republicans 
Percentage of the voters in the county in the 2000 
Presidential election that voted Republican 
47.92 10.65 
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County 
education 
Percentage of the county’s population aged 25 and older 
whose highest level of education achieved was high 
school in 1990 
83.32 4.22 
Firm-level variables 
Multi-facility =1 if the firm (parent company) owns more than one 
CAA-regulated facility in Michigan 
0.19 0.39 
Public = 1 if firm (parent company) is publicly traded 0.10 0.31 
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Table 4. Results of the facility-level analysis of environmental auditing 
 Audit equation Compliance equation 
Variable name Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Audit -- -- 1.41** 
(0.25) 
-0.51 
(0.87) 
Employees 0.00011* 
(0.000058) 
0.000094* 
(0.000053) 
-0.00021** 
(0.000078) 
-0.00015 
(0.000090) 
Manufacturing -0.015 
(0.12) 
0.0061 
(0.13) 
-0.015 
(0.077) 
-0.026 
(0.082) 
Past inspection -- -- -0.088 
(0.074) 
-0.10 
(0.082) 
Past violation -- -- -0.023 
(0.41) 
-0.020 
(0.44) 
Past inspection*Past violation -- -- 0.13 
(0.44) 
0.12 
(0.48) 
Count past inspections -0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.026 
(0.027) 
-- -- 
Past penalties -0.00062 
(0.00049) 
-0.00057 
(0.00044) 
-0.00014 
(0.00017) 
-0.00017 
(0.00018) 
Major 0.37** 
(0.14) 
0.32** 
(0.15) 
-1.95** 
(0.11) 
-2.07** 
(0.11) 
MACT 0.13 
(0.16) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
PSD 0.32* 
(0.18) 
0.37* 
(0.19) 
-0.32* 
(0.18) 
-0.28 
(0.20) 
NSR -0.93* 
(0.53) 
-1.019 
(0.56) 
-0.23 
(0.50) 
-0.37 
(0.52) 
NSPS 0.078 
(0.14) 
0.034 
(0.15) 
-0.24** 
(0.092) 
-0.21** 
(0.097) 
SIP 0.56 
(0.35) 
0.52 
(0.37) 
0.71** 
(0.18) 
0.83** 
(0.18) 
CFC 0.47* 
(0.24) 
0.38 
(0.28) 
-1.04** 
(0.20) 
-1.04** 
(0.21) 
CERCLIS -5.08** 
(0.35) 
-6.38** 
(0.93) 
0.12 
(0.34) 
-0.13 
(0.33) 
ICIS 0.15 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.054 
(0.11) 
0.085 
(0.12) 
PCS -0.041 
(0.13) 
-0.086 
(0.14) 
-0.086 
(0.11) 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
RCRA 0.44** 
(0.15) 
0.45** 
(0.16) 
0.077 
(0.081) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
TRI 0.65** 
(0.13) 
0.58** 
(0.14) 
-0.19** 
(0.095) 
-0.038 
(0.10) 
Nonattainment -- -- -0.057 -0.080 
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(0.073) (0.080) 
County conservancy  -0.077 
(0.072) 
-0.11 
(0.071) 
0.0092 
(0.041) 
0.0040 
(0.041) 
County Republicans -0.020** 
(0.0055) 
-0.020** 
(0.0056) 
0.016** 
(0.0039) 
0.014** 
(0.0044) 
County education 0.029 
(0.020) 
0.035* 
(0.021) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
Public -- 0.21 
(0.15) 
-- 0.27* 
(0.15) 
Multi-facility -- 0.53** 
(0.12) 
-- -0.24** 
(0.11) 
Constant -4.43** 
(1.47) 
-4.99** 
(1.53) 
-1.05 
(0.84) 
-1.34 
(0.87) 
Rho -0.82** 
(0.096) 
0.14 
(0.41) 
-- -- 
Log L -1168.60 -1150.76 -- -- 
Table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors, below coefficients in 
parentheses. Sample size is 2811. * indicates significance at 10% and ** indicates 
significance at 5%. 
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APPENDIX. Description of heterogeneity measures 
Industry heterogeneity 
The dataset contains up to three four-digit SIC codes for each facility. Let SIC1, SIC2, 
SIC3 represent these variables. Three steps are required to create Industry heterogeneity. 
Step 1: 
Sort facilities by parent company identifier, SIC1, SIC2, SIC3. Create a variable, called 
Industry duplicates, that equals zero if a particular sequence of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 is 
unique among facilities within a parent company. Otherwise, Industry duplicates assigns 
a count to identify the number of times a particular sequence of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 shows 
up within facilities owned by the parent company (i.e., the first facility with the sequence 
will have Industry duplicates equal to one, the second facility with that same sequence 
will have Industry duplicates equal to two, and so on). Consider a hypothetical example 
firm that owns five facilities with values for SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 given in the following 
table (-- indicates a missing value): 
Facility ID SIC1 SIC2 SIC3 Industry 
duplicates 
1 30 37 -- 0 
2 20 -- -- 1 
3 20 24 26 0 
4 20 -- -- 2 
5 20 -- -- 3 
Two sequences of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 are unique within the facilities owned by this firm 
(30, 37, --; 20, 24, 26) so the facilities with these sequences (1 and 3) are assigned values 
of Industry duplicates equal to zero. One sequence, 20, --, --, occurs three times, first for 
facility 2 (so Industry duplicates=1), second for facility 4 (so Industry duplicates=2), and 
third for facility 5 (so Industry duplicates=3). 
Step 2: 
Identify the maximum value of Industry duplicates among facilities owned by each 
parent company. Call this Max industry duplicates. Note that if a firm has Max industry 
duplicates equal to Num facilities (the # of facility owned by the parent company), then 
all facilities owned by that parent company have the same values for the sequence SIC1, 
SIC2, SIC3. If Max industry duplicates is equal to zero, then each facility owned by the 
firm has a unique sequence of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3.  
Step 3: 
Form Industry heterogeneity for each firm using the following: 
Industry heterogeneity
facilitiesNum
duplicatesindustryMaxfacilitiesNum −
= . 
Since the range of Max industry duplicates is zero to Num facilities for each firm, 
Industry heterogeneity is bounded between zero and one where zero indicates 
homogeneity (i.e., facilitiesNumduplicatesindustryMax = ) and one indicates the 
largest degree of heterogeneity (i.e., 0=duplicatesindustryMax ). 
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Regulatory heterogeneity 
This measure is formed using an analogous three step method. However, we are 
interested in the values of the sequence of five variables: CERCLIS, ICIS, PCS, RCRA, 
TRI. If Max regulatory duplicates represent the maximum value of Regulatory duplicates 
(where this measure is formed as described above), then 
Regulatory heterogeneity
facilitiesNum
duplicatesregulatoryMaxfacilitiesNum −
= . 
 
Size heterogeneity 
This measure uses only one variable, rather than a sequence of variables as the other two 
measures so forming it is more straightforward. We use Employees, the number of 
employees at the facility, to create a categorical variable, Cat employees where  







<
≤<
≤<
≤
=
Employeesif
Employeesif
Employeesif
Employeesif
employeesCat
5004
5001003
100102
101
 
We then create a variable for each facility, Employee duplicates, formed using the same 
method as described above, based on the values of Cat employees at the facilities owned 
by a given parent company. Letting Max employee duplicates represent the maximum 
value of Employee duplicates among facilities owned by a parent company, we form Size 
heterogeneity using the same technique as with the other two heterogeneity measures: 
Size heterogeneity
facilitiesNum
duplicatesemployeeMaxfacilitiesNum −
=  
 
 
